Many of the proponents of the “two kingdoms” theology in the Reformed world read Calvin as teaching that the “spiritual kingdom” is the church, and the “temporal kingdom” is the rest of the outside world.  This is incorrect and actually approximates the old Roman Catholic position.  For Calvin, the spiritual kingdom is the invisible church, and the temporal kingdom is the entire external realm- visible church, state, and family.  Here’s a short quote that gets right to the point.  From Calvin’s commentary on 1 Cor. 11:1-16:

There is somewhat more of difficulty in what follows. Here the man is placed in an intermediate position between Christ and the woman, so that Christ is not the head of the woman. Yet the same Apostle teaches us elsewhere, (Galatians 3:28,) that in Christ there is neither male nor female. Why then does he make a distinction here, which in that passage he does away with? I answer, that the solution of this depends on the connection in which the passages occur. When he says that there is no difference between the man and the woman, he is treating of Christ’s spiritual kingdom, in which individual distinctions [“External qualities” -ed.] are not regarded, or made any account of; for it has nothing to do with the body, and has nothing to do with the outward relationships of mankind, but has to do solely with the mind — on which account he declares that there is no difference, even between bond and free. In the meantime, however, he does not disturb civil order or honorary distinctions, which cannot be dispensed with in ordinary life. Here, on the other hand, he reasons respecting outward propriety and decorum — which is a part of ecclesiastical polity. Hence, as regards spiritual connection in the sight of God, and inwardly in the conscience, Christ is the head of the man and of the woman without any distinction, because, as to that, there is no regard paid to male or female; but as regards external arrangement and political decorum, the man follows Christ and the woman the man, so that they are not upon the same footing, but, on the contrary, this inequality exists.

Notice here that Calvin says Christ’s kingdom does not concern the body or any external relations.  It is wholly inward and has to do with conscience.  Thus there is total equality and immediate relationship between Christ and all believers in the spiritual kingdom.

The temporal kingdom is different.  It has to do with the body and all external conditions.  It still has mediation and hierarchy.  This is how Calvin defends against forms of egalitarianism which would stem from certain Pauline texts.  All of the “spiritual kingdom” truths have to do with the life of the soul.  Notice also that Calvin says “ecclesiastical polity” is a part of the external realm, civil order, and ordinary life.

Much follows from this, but I’ll have to leave that for another time.

We meet in Clinton, at Emeritus at Tracepointe, 501 E. Northside Drive.  We’ll have accommodations for nursery and childcare.  Come see us this weekend!

Next Thursday, Jan. 12th, I will be presenting a paper for the Southern Political Science Association in New Orleans, LA.  My panel is called “People of God? The Role of Political Hebraism in America,” and it meets from 3:00 to 4:30pm.  I’m presenting on the 19th cent. Presbyterian-Catholic debates of John Breckinridge and John Hughes.  Here’s an abstract:

The notion of religious tolerance in early 19^th century America was hotly contested, and perhaps nowhere do we see how hot that contest could get as in the debates between John Breckinridge and John Hughes over religious principles and American liberty. Their political dialogue reveals a mixture of Enlightenment ideals and specifically theological convictions, and as it was in early 19^th century America that the new religious tolerance was most clearly put to the test, an examination of the intellectual assumptions involved is helpful in locating the distinctive contours of the new Liberal settlement. There was not an easy or obvious settlement, as the history of anti-Catholicism in America has shown. Although anti-Catholic bigotry was involved in some of the controversies of the time, it is also the case that some of the specific arguments of the anti-Catholics reflected the matrix of political, philosophical, and religious ideals upon which the American settlement was founded, claiming a specifically Protestant foundation for Liberal religious toleration. The Catholics, on their part, pointed to aspects of the Protestants’ own history which contradicted their new sentiment. My investigation will seek to highlight the conflicting demands of religious communities and American civic liberty, identifying the basic principles and the rhetoric of ecclesiastical self-representation. It will also illustrate that certain theories of natural rights were themselves dependent upon religious or transcendental commitments, a fact which Revolutionary secularity did not always aim to highlight, but which became obvious in debates such as the one between Breckinridge and Hughes.

I would also like to compare the intellectual features of Breckinridge and Hughes’ arguments with the claims about developing secularity made by the contemporary writers Philip Hamburger and Eric Nelson. While the relevance to Hamburger’s work on the American notion of separation of church and state is obvious, Nelson’s treatment of the 16^th and 17^th century Hebraicists might seem much more remotely pertinent. In many ways, however, John Breckinridge’s Protestant version of religious tolerance directly mirrors the early modern moves highlighted by Nelson, and his own religious tradition was an heir of that earlier British thought. In this respect, it may be possible to show that the American development of secularity was a continuation of and not a departure from earlier modern Liberal views.

Is abortion moral? 

This question is the elephant in the room.  Almost no one in the pro-choice camp is willing to answer in the affirmative.  They will always say that abortion is to be regretted, yet there are other influential factors that may make certain abortions morally justifiable.

We can already anticipate more questions, but we must not run off just yet.  Let’s stick to this one question.  Is abortion moral?  Or rather, is it moral to end the life of (kill) a human entity (person?  being?  life?) prior to its birth?

I think that most everyone agrees that this question is answered in the same way the more basic question of murder is answered.  Peter Singer is willing to distinguish along the lines of consciousness (rather than life), but Peter Singer is evil.  He would say that it is morally permissible to abort a newborn.  But again, he also says that the only problem with bestiality is that it is too difficult to determine consent.  Am I poisoning the well here?  Perhaps I am.  My apologies.  I have stepped outside the bounds of my calm and clear discourse.  I am very sorry.  Let us return to it.

Most people think that ending a human life, apart from some morally and legally justified reason (the forfeiture of rights through a crime, self-defense, war), is wrong.  This is a basic moral principle.  It’s a “thou shalt not” kind of thing.  Ending human life, even in the womb, is wrong.

We could defend this from the Bible.  You’ve seen the verses.  We could defend this from reason- the natural law.  We could even defend this from the golden rule.  Abortion survivors are rarely pro-choice.

So abortion itself is immoral.  But as we know, the conversation does not end here.  Perhaps it is a necessary evil.  Are there other reasons why one might procure an abortion, and if so, would those reasons outweigh the basic moral question?

What is most important? (or Do we make decisions based on inherent virtue, perceived consequences, or efficiency?  or Are we already men without chests?)

There’s an old philosophical question: Do you like things because they are good, or are things good because you like them?  This can be given all sorts of descriptive titles.  “Realism” vs. “Voluntarism.”  Aristotelianism (and then we have to decide if that’s good or bad!).  Here’s a starting point for this conversation.

Basically, to even entertain the question of “Are there other reasons to have an abortion which outweigh the basic moral issue?” is to itself entertain the larger question of how one comes to decisions and which commitments have priority in ethics.  It is not merely one question.  This is actually the entire farm.  Someone’s about to sell it.

We are not at the “legal” level yet.  We’ll get to that.  Morality and politics do have a meeting point.  But we aren’t there yet.  We’re just on the individual level of deciding morality.  On what basis do you make your judgment?

We have to be very careful here, even with our language.  “Judgement” is already tricky.  “Values” is even worse.  We can influence the debate, without even realizing it, as we use words that connote ideas which may contradict our theories and beliefs.

Classical ethics side with Aristotle.  Things are good because they are good.  Inherently so.  We could go further and say that the Good is united with the True and the Beautiful.  In Christian-speak, God is the Good and His Will is identical with His nature.

This is also the core view of the New Testament.  Men are not righteous merely by following the rules.  That’s how slaves operate (Gal. 4:1-5).  A righteous man does not do what is right because something tells him to do so, but rather he does right because that’s just what he is.  He is a tree that produces fruit.  Good things come from good people.  Furthermore, we are instructed that merely “going through motions” or following instruction in order to merely avoid punishment (rather than to also positively seek the good) is insufficient.  “Bondservants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not with eyeservice, as men-pleasers, but in sincerity of heart, fearing God.  And whatever you do, do it heartily, as to the Lord and not to men,” (Colossians 3:22-23).

C. S. Lewis, in his brilliantly-titled “Men Without Chests” (the first chapter of The Abolition of Man), makes the case that only this way of thinking can provide for objectivity.  Further, an ontologically objective- or a transcendent- grounding for ethics is necessary in order to satisfy our need for honor, liveliness, goodness, and respectability.  Brains and bellies both cry out for a heart.  Lewis writes:

We were told it long ago by Plato.  As the king governs by his executive, so Reason in man must rule the mere appetites by means of the “spirited element.”  The head rules the belly through the chest– the seat, as Alanus tells us, of Magnanimity, of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments.  The Chest– Magnanimity– Sentiment– these are the indispensable liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man.  It may even be said that it is by this middle element that man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal.  The operation of The Green Book [a book which rejects the existence of virtue, calling it all only subjective value, SW] and its kind is to produce what may be called Men without Chests…

And all the time–such is the tragi-comedy of our situation–we continue to clamour for those very qualities we are rendering impossible.  You can hardly open a periodical without coming across the statement that what our civilization needs is more “drive,” or dynamism, or self-sacrifice, or “creativity.”  In a sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and demand the function.  We make men without chests and expect of them virtue and enterprise.  We laugh at honour and are shocked to find traitors in our midst.  We castrate and bid the geldings be fruitful.

(p 34-35, Collier Books 1955)

It seems only prudent that we take a pause here.  There is much more to be said, but I’ll leave you with this thought about ethical foundations.  Have you ever thought that someone or some group of people were “heartless”?  Have you been careful to make sure that you weren’t one of those who first performed the excision?

More ethical questions will be raised in the next post.

While I supported Prop. 26 and am still convinced that it was a morally justified position, I am willing to have the conversation about each of these issues.  From my own perspective, I am convinced that the ethical questions will always have a singular answer, however, the prudential political questions may vary depending upon our context and ability.  Still, what I saw more than anything else was a failure on the part of the citizenry to articulate clear principles and to explain why they would support one practice yet condemn another.  We did not have our first principles in order, nor did we quite know how the law ought to work in support of those principles.

Because of this, I would like to have an extended conversation about these matters.  I want to examine those principles, as well as ask certain key questions as to why people think and decide as they do.  A distinct but directly related issue is the proper role of law and the most appropriate jurisdiction for certain social and civil protections.  Until these are fleshed out, the pro-life conversation is really only partisan.

What do I mean by partisan?  I mean what we already know.  “Pro-life” is almost never a legitimate talking point in politics, but rather a carrot which the Republicans dangle in front of the social conservatives.  It also happens to be a point of hysteria for both ends of the political spectrum.  It is an expression that is used to draw battle lines.  It is religious.  It is apocalyptic.

The far Right uses abortion to decide between the forces of light and the forces of darkness.  They have gruesome poster boards.  From time to time they shoot people over this matter.  But the far Left is just as crazy, if not more so.  They use abortion as the ultimate benchmark in personal liberty, deriding pro-lifers as backwards and bumpkinesque.  I was told that by supporting Prop. 26 that I was almost certainly a misogynist, and one otherwise smart young man told his equally smart sister that if she supported Prop. 26 he would no longer be able to trust her as a serious intellect, judging her to instead be a fanatic (and perhaps a cult member).

Adding to the complicating anecdotes is that conservatives who oppose the intrusive reach of the State are willing to support legislation that has the possibility of requiring criminal investigations for miscarriages and perhaps prescriptions as to the permissible behavior of pregnant women.  Equally contradictory are the liberals, who otherwise want to outlaw Happy Meals, saying that their body is outside of the State’s jurisdiction.  Pro-choice material is some of the most libertarian (if not anarchistic) literature in the political arena.  How is it that each side can appear to violate their political principles in the service of a singular issue?

One thing abortion is not, or at least not very often, is reasonably and carefully discussed.  Why should one believe a certain way on this issue, particularly in light of other basic beliefs?  What sort of laws ought to be created in light of those beliefs?  Can we be consistent on this matter, and if so, on what grounds?

Until we have a reasonable discussion in public fora, it seems unlikely that pro-life will ever get beyond religious and social boundaries.  I am convinced that pro-life is both an issue of religion and of reason, and thus I don’t enjoy either side dismissing or abusing religion or reason in the pursuit of their goals.  So I would like to ask a few questions and, hopefully, approach a few answers.

We can divide the discussion into two parts: the ethical and the political.  These are not fully “separate” (as in having nothing to do with one another), but they are distinct.  Not all sins are crimes.  And, except for rebellion, not all crimes are necessarily sins.  I would refer the reader to my paper on natural law for a further discussion about these distinctions.

In the next series of posts, I will be laying out the various questions that arise under each heading, and hopefully, we can accumulate enough information and coherent propositions to be able to articulate a rationally coherent and rhetorically effective pro-life case.

I have seen a number of very bad arguments against Prop. 26. I will handle them quickly.

• Prop. 26 pushes private values into the public square. – This is a variant of the old line, “You can’t legislate morality.” In point of fact, you can’t legislate much else besides morality. Take a look at our laws. Nearly all of them are grounded on morality. To the issue of “private values,” however, we can say that Prop. 26 is pretty decidedly public. It is seeking to define “person” in the state constitution.  It is not trying to tell you what you should think about persons or how mommas and poppas ought to inculcate such persons. It is only addressing the state’s duty towards a person, and that is public by definition.
• Trust families, not politicians – This little slogan comes from the website http://parentsagainstms26.com/. It is seeking to use otherwise “conservative” and “small government” rhetoric against Prop. 26. The problem is that you cannot “trust families” to recognize a person’s legal rights. Families do not, in fact, have that jurisdiction. Families cannot decide to take away civil rights from their family members. This is really a rather silly slogan.
• Prop. 26 is too vague – This was actually one of the complaints that our governor made against Prop. 26 before he voted for it anyway. I’ve heard this from a number of people, but I cannot understand it. Apparently these people are bothered by the phrase “functional equivalent thereof.” This is not actually a vague statement at all, however. It is general, but it is not vague. The immediate context gives all of the necessary information to see that “functional equivalent” means, “any technique which fertilizes an egg.” This statement is much less vague than other expressions that are already well-established in law. “Due process” is just one example. There are any number of constitutional amendments which are open to multiple interpretations. That’s just the nature of law. General statements must be applied in specific scenarios by informed legal and political actors. Also, Prop. 26 is making an already-existing vagueness more specific. As it stands, the definition of “person” is in doubt and this proposition seeks to clarify it.

Now, those are the bad arguments. Unfortunately they are the most popular. However, I would not want to say they are the only arguments. Indeed there are a few points which require some clear thinking. I have friends who I consider to be good and intelligent people who are opposed to Prop. 26, and I have many who are undecided. I’d like to speak to a few of the more intricate points of this discussion.

• Though obviously informed by religious convictions, a supporter of Prop. 26 need not rely solely on the Bible. As a Christian, a pastor, and something of a theological political science practitioner, I would be the last person to say that we should leave our religious thought out of this conversation. However, it is still not the only consideration that is relevant. In classical thought, a “person” was understood as a particular instantiation of a “nature.” Further, among Aristotle’s four causes, the final cause was the most determinative of the others. Thus we could say that a thing ought to be defined in terms of its telos, and that it is most appropriate to work towards a thing’s fulfilling of its end. A fertilized egg’s telos is naturally a human person.
• “Personhood” in this conversation is a legal consideration. We are not dealing exclusively with biology or even sociology or psychology. There is a long-standing historical record to testify that slaves were once not considered legal persons. Though they were living, breathing, and thinking human beings, they were nevertheless not legal persons. This changed in America over time, and the change in the point of view was clearly influenced by moral, religious, and philosophical concerns. Even trickier is that fact that, today, Walmart is considered a legal person! It is important to remember that Prop. 26 is concerned with “person” as used in the MS bill of rights.
• The fact that Prop. 26 might have implications on other areas of life is not unimportant, but those implications are not themselves enough to settle the issue. One really ought to decide whether or not he agrees with the assertion of Prop. 26 first, and then he may examine the implications. After all, if an entity is a person, then the fact that its rights might conflict with yours is simply a reality.
• Closely related are the issues of in vitro fertilization (specifically the fate of the unused zygotes), stem cell (and other medical )research, and abortion in the cases of rape or incest. On more than one occasion these things are assumed to be obviously good, and thus Prop. 26′s possible prohibition of them is seen as a good argument against Prop. 26. The thinking is still backwards. If the fertilized egg is actually a person, then these things are not good. I do not mean to be offensive, but such is a necessary conclusion. To justify the taking away of civil rights (or human life!) on the basis of efficiency or scientific progress is immoral. For an excellent discussion on this matter, I would direct the reader to two sources: C. S. Lewis’s That Hideous Strength and The Abolition of Man.
• Many people have taken a position of caution based on honest ignorance. They say that we do not actually know when an entity becomes a person and so we ought not make legal decisions that presume that we do. This is a reasonable statement. I can sympathize with those who ask it, and I believe that if one truly does not believe that a fertilized egg is a person, then he ought not vote for Prop. 26. For those who do not yet know, I would offer a few thoughts.
  • If we truly do not know if a fertilized egg is a person or not, we can imagine a few scenarios. The first is that the entity is not a person, and thus there is neither harm nor foul in violating its rights. As a non-person, it has no rights. The second is that the entity is not a person, but we protect its rights anyway out of a sense of caution. In this scenario, others are potentially encumbered by the fertilized egg’s rights, even though it should not have them. The third is that the entity is a person, but we do not protect its rights. Thus in order to protect others’ freedoms, we deprive the fertilized egg of its rights and perhaps even its life. To those of you who truly do not know, I would ask you what the safest route of procedure is. To not decide is not an option. Any action or inaction will result in the one of the three scenarios. We simply do not know with certainty which. Given that, what does prudence dictate?
  • For Christians, however, I think we have added information that supports legal status being given to a fertilized egg. We could point to relevant passages about life in the womb, but those wouldn’t quite give us the need for legal recognition (and certainly not at the specific point of fertilization). We do have a passage which is appropriate, however, and that is Judges 13:4-5. This is not hyperbole or poetic rhetoric. It is historical narrative. In Judges 13:4-5, Samson’s mother is told that her son will be a Nazirite and so she must begin observing certain Nazirite restrictions in the present, prior even to his conception, so as not to cause him to violate those restrictions in the womb. The Nazirite status was a legal one, normally entered into by a consenting adult (see Numbers 6). In this case, however, the vow was being applied by God, and it was a life-long vow. Thus it had to begin at the earliest stages. In order to accomplish this, Samson’s mother was asked to change her behavior prior even to conception. This presupposes that at the moment of conception Samson would have a personal identity, a relationship with God, and the capacity to have legal status.
• Complicated legal situations may arise when the rights of multiple persons come into tension with one another. This is true already, and Prop. 26 is actually not adding to this complexity at all because those issues already exist and personhood is currently undefined. Any possible “difficult case” that I’ve heard as an argument against Prop. 26 can still exist without Prop. 26. Prop. 26 does not create those difficult cases.
• Further, it would seem to me that the proper way to move forward regarding legal conundra is not to deny personhood to one of the parties involved, but rather to continue the conversation, adding relevant clarifications and protections for the specific situations. Prop. 26 would not settle all or even any of these difficult scenarios. We would still need to discuss power of attorney, as well as the State’s duty to protect. But we must do that anyway.
  
  Roe v. Wade actually has some insane logic on precisely this point. It says that, since it is unclear when life begins, it will decide to protect the mother’s rights up to a certain point in development and then after that point, it will protect the rights of the child in the womb. This is law by coin flip. In no sane universe does it make sense to settle a genuine legal dilemma by denying personhood to one of the two parties. We should either explore ways to respect the rights of all persons or clearly express our principles for limiting one party’s rights in a given scenario. In no case is it sufficient to simply deny personhood.

Those are my thoughts on the matter. I was initially not very motivated to participate in this discussion because I saw Prop. 26 as overly limited (exactly the opposite of its critics’ claims). However, witnessing and participating in a few recent conversations has proven to me that more than the specifics of Prop. 26 are actually at stake. Rather this is a strategic opportunity to state and clarify pro-Life principles as well as a consistent Christian legal thought. And if the national media is any trustworthy guide, Prop. 26 will be influential upon future legal decisions across the US.

This definitely applies to certain personalities that are attracted to religious extremism. It really isn’t even correct to call it religious extremism, because, as we saw in the case of Breivik, they can routinely admit to not being very religious at all. So let’s call it cultural extremism.  Cultural extremists are on a quest, and they are trying to solve a deep problem in their lives.  They are disaffected with modernity and long for another era where the men were men and the living was authentic. Whether it be some notion of medieval Europe, the golden age of Islam, or even the American founding, a nearly utopian world is created in which the cultural extremist can find his new identity. He may or may not cease to be active out in the “real world” (his local community and the public square), but he certainly devotes the majority of his interests to the alternative world.

We saw this in Breivik as he described himself as playing lots of World of Warcraft and Modern Warfare 2, even crediting them as a sort of training ground. Additionally Breivik claimed to be a member of the Knights Templar, an institution that has not existed for centuries and is largely now the property of Dan Brown-style conspiracy fantasies. Breivik listened to the soundtracks of Conan the Barbarian and the Lord of the Rings on his iPod, supposedly while he was carrying out his shootings. There’s a real marriage between warrior and geek in Breivik’s personality. What struck me the most, however, was the military wetsuit that he created for himself and appears in at the 12 min. mark of this video. On his left arm is a patch which reads: “MARXIST HUNTER… Multiculti Traitor Hunting Permit.”

Breivik in his real-life Dungeons and Dragons costume.

Now think about that for a minute. While building his bombs, buying his guns, and planning a mass murder, this guy also played dress up. I mean really, a fake hunter’s permit patch? That’s outrageously geeky. Breivik was playing his own sort of RPG throughout all of this.

This kind of thing happens routinely among ideologues, albeit certainly to a lesser degree. Everyone who is familiar with Presbyterianism knows that when a Baptist becomes a Presbyterian, they typically have to watch Braveheart, buy a CD of bagpipe music, and, if they live below the Mason-Dixon line, develop a strong fondness for the antebellum South. Anglicans have their own version of this. I know several young men who have adopted the British spellings of colour and honour as a way to show their commitment to the true faith. Usually these sorts of things are left at the level of fun and geeky side-interests, but if the convert is himself alienated from a community of friends or particularly angry at the world, these character quirks can turn into something else. This is what was going on with Breivik, and, with certain modifications to fit the scene, this is also what’s going on with a lot of Islamic radicalism.  They are allowing their ideological fascinations to become an alternative identity.

This isn’t just a sampling of silly hobbies that accompany religious ideologies. This is actually part of wider condition throughout modernity which transcends the various ideologies under discussion, and we do have a relatively recent portrayal of this disposition in popular American culture: Fight Club.

Fight Club

First a book and then a popular movie (though as a cult classic, which is more appropriate for the topic at hand), Fight Club is a portrait of a man jilted by modernity and in search of something more authentic and primal in his life. He begins a secret club where men can regain their true identities by fighting. This eventually becomes a terrorist organization with the goal of bringing down modern corporate America. Sound familiar? There’s no religion in Fight Club because the phenomenon is its own issue. We could say that it is its own religion. And what I’d like to propose is that radical Islam and right-wing nationalism have more in common with each other than they do with their own purported cultural and religious histories. They are Fight Club.

As I mentioned in a previous post, I am not willing to say that there’s nothing to worry about with Islam. But I am insisting that what there is to worry about with Islam is totally different than what the majority of the media and mainstream press get worked up over. What they’re always on about is either something worth considering (the idea that religion and culture might actually impact each other) or it’s just the Fight Club phenomenon. And when dealing with this latter issue, we don’t need to be fooled into thinking that it’s primarily a political or theological issue. It’s a personal issue. People attracted to real-life RPGs in the form of partisan hostility do not need so much to be combated on the intellectual level, but on the existential one. They are having trouble with “reentry” and need to come back to reality.

"Reentry" is Walker Percy's term for when someone attempts to bring their life back to normalcy.

There’s certainly a political angle to extremism. I wouldn’t want to deny that. The leadership of many terrorist groups has adopted its style of action because of the necessities of being a non-state actor or what Carl Schmitt called “the partisan.” Schmitt’s political and historical reading is important, to be sure, and it shows that the tactics of terrorism come from a very specific military strategy which has its origins in Spain and Russia, further supporting my insistence that it cannot be addressed merely by religious or philosophical ideology (though again, to be clear, religious and philosophical ideology is important and does have a role to play). Nevertheless, as helpful as this is in addressing the organizational level of extremism, I still believe that the Fight Club phenomenon best addresses the recruitment level. It is, as much as anything, the root of the problem.  They have an identity crisis.

What’s the solution? Daddy-issues-styled therapy? Perhaps. But more simply I think these individuals need to be reassured of their own manhood (or personhood in general) and given appropriate outlets to realize their desires. They need to kill and eat so to speak, but they need to be able to do this in non-harmful ways. Instead of being told to repress their energy, they need to be told to redirect it an appropriate manner. Instead of radical politics, they need what the old Protestant theologians called vocation, or a personal calling to work in the world. This isn’t limited to a job, though that’s not a bad start. It also includes marriage, a family, building something for the community, creating a larger life-project, and even contributing to the common good. This is where the churches can and should come in to address the problem. And I suppose that this is the level where ideology will also come back on the scene.

Churches cannot use “culture wars” to promote alternative realities and Fight Clubs.  Instead, they have to be able to marshal a prophetic critique that is consistent with all of the prophets.  “Seek the peace of the city,” -he said. “For in its peace you will have peace.”

1. Darryl Hart’s Response to My 2 Kingdoms Essay

2. Apostolic Succession and Civic Freedom (pt. 1)

3. Apostolic Succession and Civic Freedom (pt. 2)

4. Apostolic Succession and Civic Freedom (pt. 3)

5. Neo-Anabaptism and the Kingdom (pt. 1)

6. Neo-Anabaptism and the Kingdom (pt. 2)

7. Neo-Anabaptism and the Kingdom (pt. 3)