“Simplicity” is the underlying definition of, or way to understand, the divine essence. Though hotly contested among modern and post-modern theologians (you can see the shift in the mid-19th cent. Bavinck even critiques Charles Hodge in a footnote about this very subject), simplicity was mostly universally accepted throughout Christendom. Recently Lewis Ayres has identified three organizational planks behind pro-Nicene theology, and simplicity is right at the top of the list. It is the statement that God is not composed of “parts,” nor do his attributes make up a composite. All of God is all of God, and each of His attributes is Him. “Simple” is thus opposed to complex or composite.
Simplicity is really another way to explain infinity. If God is outside of space and time, and thus always all that He is without bounds, then no “real” distinctions can be placed within His being. This means Continue reading →
The terms “nature,” “substance,” and “essence” all signify the same thing when speaking of the being of God in Trinitarian nomenclature. We’ve previously mentioned the occasional confusion of “substance” and “person” (because of the meaning of hypostasis), and there is similar confusion in the possibility of distinguishing between “substance” and “essence,” however, the terms were eventually worked out into a consistent fashion. Though “substance” and “essence” could mean different things when speaking of the creation, they meant the same when speaking of God. Each word signified the single divine being.
Like we saw with “person,” the actual definition of these terms is quite bare. Esse means “the act of existing.” Essentia means “the whatness of a being.” Natura also means essentia or quidditas: “the character of something.” Substantia could have the connotation of material “stuff,” but in Trinitarian nomenclature it was always identified with the essence and thus spiritual, invisible, simple, and infinite. Continue reading →
“Person” is the English translation of the Latin term persona and the Greek term hypostasis. “Person” was used to denominate the individual and irreducible existence of the divine Father, Son, and Spirit respectively. In fact, the most direct definition of “person” would be the rather uninspiring expressions “something that exists” or “mode of subsistence.” In Thomism it would gain the added notion of “subsistent relation,” though that definition is still very much contested. In no case, however, did it have the modern basically univocal meaning of human “person,” still less “personality.”
Richard Muller explains how the older definition of “person” differed from its contemporary meaning here. Bavinck states plainly:
The Christian church and Christian theology, it must be remembered, never used the word “personality” to describe God’s being; and in respect of the three modes of subsistence in that being, they only spoke of persons reluctantly and for lack of a better term. (Reformed Dogmatic vol. 2, pg. 50)
Person really doesn’t mean “person,” at least not in the ordinary sense we use it today. Continue reading →
Whenever we talk about the Trinity, we are talking about the being and nature of God, and therefore we are talking about something that is beyond us. We are talking about something for which we have no full category. There are no exact earthly parallels. This is not because there is a problem with God’s revelation, nor does it call into question the trustworthiness of religion. It is simply because God is God. He is infinite. He is outside our conceptions of time and space. His name is wonderful.
This doctrine is universally confessed by Christians. Sometimes it goes by other names: unknowability, hyperousia, apophatic, via negativa, etc. The concept is the same. God is incomprehensible. He has revealed Himself in a trustworthy manner, but since He nevertheless remains Who He is, Christianity teaches that human knowledge of God is always analogical.
The argument that in Scripture God accommodates Himself to us through our language directly follows from the admission of divine incomprehensibility. Continue reading →
The Trinity is an expression of Christian monotheism. Modern neo-Trinitarian theologians may protest that I am here assuming what needs to be proved, but the response is simply that this series is an explanation of the historic meaning. If one wishes to contest this meaning, then that is their privilege, but they will then assume the burden of showing why their formulation can use the traditional signifiers while disagreeing with the traditional things signified. For now, we explain the faith.
The Trinity is One God. The Biblical support for this is found in Deut. 6:4 and James 2:19 (among other NT passages). At no point does the Bible apply the term “gods” to the Creator, nor does it suggest that any other heavenly beings are equal with Him. The Nicene Creed sates “We believe in one God.” The pseudo-Athanasian Creed states, “That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity” and “they are not three Gods, but one God. ” The 39 Articles state, “There is but one living and true God.” The Heidelberg Catechism takes monotheism for granted, wishing to know how the confession of 3 persons does not contradict it. It answers, “these three distinct persons are the one only true and eternal God” (Q&A 25). The Westminster Confession of Faith mostly echoes the 39 Articles and adds to them, retaining monotheism at the very beginning of its discussion, “There is but one only living and true God…” Continue reading →
Narrowly speaking, the Bible does not provide us with an exhaustive (or even fully explicit) theology of the Trinity. The Bible does teach the doctrine of the Trinity, to be sure, but it does so by implication. It gives us the revelation of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and it tells us that these three are one, in various ways. Anyone who has studied the history of the theological explanation of the Trinity, however, knows that this is only the starting gate of the discussion. At no point did Arians, Sabellians, Eunomians, or any of the various Homoian groups flatly reject scriptural verses. The debate was always over interpretation and implication. This is not illegitimate, nor is its admission any departure from traditional Protestant Christianity. Calvinists have always insisted on the need to deduce “good and necessary consequences” from the Bible and to insist that those too are part of the whole counsel of God (WCF 1.6).
This little preamble is necessary because of the recent shift to speaking of “Trinitarianism” or explicitly “Trinitarian” formulations of dogmatics. This manner of speech capitalizes on the historic importance placed upon the doctrine of the Trinity and the rightful recognition that the doctrine of the Trinity is one of the unique confessions of Christianity. What is less frequently admitted is that to appeal to “the Trinity” is to appeal to a specific theological construct and an objective tradition of theologizing. There really is a specific referent when we say “the Trinity,” and it includes a number of basic doctrines. Unfortunately many of these basic doctrines are either unknown or rejected by a good many of modern theologians who wish to cash in on the value of the term “Trinity.” Therefore it will be necessary to lay out explicitly a number of the basic doctrines which underlay the theology of “the Trinity” in order for us all to be speaking of the same thing. It will be the goal of this series to make plain what “the Trinity” actually means in historic Christian dogma.
We must also say that while the doctrine of the Trinity is supra-rational, it is not irrational. At no point do Christians concede that the formulation of the Trinity is a violation of logic. It is a mystery, to be sure, but not a contradiction. Therefore it is appropriate to use reason in the service of dogmatics, and it will not be deemed wrong to ask for clarity and consistency in our discussions. Such is the classic Reformed position.